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1 
2 
3 Introduction 
4 
5 The purpose of this special issue of the Journal of Health Organization and Management is 
6 to examine the role that public participation plays in the setting of health care priorities. Our 
7 
8 concern is to map the various forms that public participation takes and to evaluate its role in 
9 
10 priority setting in respect of important social values, including legitimacy and accountability. 
11 As we highlighted in the introductory paper, our focus is on public participation understood 
13 in its relation to public policy. We examine participation that is collective rather   than 
14 
15 individual, excluding consideration of the role of patients in the determination of their 
16 individual care. We also focus on participation that is about priorities as a matter of policy in 
18 general, even if the participation is triggered by a particular case, for example    with an appeal 
19 
20 to an administrative body by an individual about a denial of treatment. Because participation 
21 must be relevant to the making or changing of policy, participation in pure research on public 
23 attitudes, for example replies to questionnaires, is excluded in our analysis,    although 
24 
25 participation in research that is an element of the policy process, for example patient feed- 
26 back responses, is a form of participation. 
28 
29 Even with these exclusions, public participation takes a wide variety of forms and 
30 terminology varies sometimes extending to involvement and representation (Arnstein, 1969; 
31 
32 Conklin et al., 2012: 158-9; Gauvin et al., 2010; Greer, Wismar, Figueras and McKee,    2016: 
33 
34 35-6; Mitton et al., 2009: 223; Rowe and Frewer, 2005; Tritter and McCallum, 2006). In the 
35 present context, participation includes public representatives sitting on decision-making 
36 
37 bodies, either as elected representatives or as appointed ones.   It covers  institutionalized 
38 
39 relationships of consultation and discussion between policy makers and patient groups or 
40 other stakeholders, including stakeholder forums, consultations, partnerships and advisory 
41 
42 committees.   It may involve the use of minipublics established by policy making bodies   or 
43 
44 forms of participatory budgeting. Importantly, for our purposes, it also includes what in the 
45 Introduction was called ‘contestatory participation’ in the form of court challenges, 
46 
47 demonstrations, protests, sit-ins and the  like. 
48 
49 
What is the relationship between the way in which priority setting is   institutionalized, 
50 
51 patterns of public participation and the mobilization of the public in decisions    on priorities? 
52 
53 In this paper, we suggest that there may be an inverse relationship between representational 
54 participation that is participation initiated and organized by policy making institutions, which 
55 
56 may be thought of as engineered participation (Blaug,  2002), and contestatory   participation 
57 
58 on the other hand, which is outside the scope of the processes and initiatives defined by 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 policy makers. This distinction can be regarded as an extended version of Stewart’s    (2016: 
4 
5 13-14; 127-8) ‘invited’ and ‘uninvited’  participation. 
6 
7 A key analytical concept in this context is that of political opportunity structures.    This 
8 
9 concept was developed in the context of explaining cross-national patterns of anti-nuclear 
10 protests in the 1980s (Kitschelt, 1986). The concept highlights the extent to which different 
11 
12 types of institutions and processes create different opportunities for political   participation. 
13 
14 To the extent to which a relationship between institutions and opportunity structures holds, 
15 patterns of public participation will depend upon the form of health care organization that a 
16 
17 country possesses, as well as general features of the political and cultural context.     For 
18 
19 example, in social insurance systems there is an institutional distinction between local and 
20 central government on the one hand and the social insurance agency on the other. In a tax- 
21 
22 funded system, where local government structures are used to deliver health care, there may 
23 
24 be an opportunity for participation through the electoral process that does not exist in a social 
25 insurance system. Institutions distribute political opportunities. 
26 
27 
28 Public involvement and participation is also likely to be influenced by the more general 
29 institutional arrangements that are found in different countries. Federal political systems will 
30 
31 induce different forms of organization from unitary systems. The age and extent   of 
32 
33 democracy within a country is also likely to have an effect, both through setting the formal 
34 constitutional context within which health care is provided, for example whether the 
35 
36 constitution guarantees a right to health, as well as the patterns of political attitudes    and 
37 
38 culture that generally inform behavior within a country. Relationships between health care 
39 participation and these broader contextual variables are neither simple nor straightforward. 
40 
41 The vibrancy of political mobilization in new democracies may be off-set by the    weakness of 
42 
43 state institutions in those same societies, resulting in a situation in which active mobilization 
44 encounters ineffective state structure. By contrast, in older democracies, the social contracts 
45 
46 embodied in the relationships between the state and health care professionals,   health care 
47 
48 industries and sub-national political actors as part of the process of introducing universal 
49 health care may well substantially constrain the scope and effectiveness of public 
50 
51 participation in the making of policy (compare Marmor and Klein, 2012:   416). 
52 
53 The paper proceeds as follows: the next section outlines the methods and data for our study 
54 
55 before going on to look in a subsequent section at the health policy contexts for the twelve 
56 
57 countries; the following section describes the political opportunity structures that   might 
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1 
2 
3 support public participation or mobilization aimed at influencing the distribution of    power in 
4 
5 priority setting; a subsequent section proposes that there is an inverse relationship between 
6 routinized or institutionalized participation on the one hand and contestatory participation, on 
7 
8 the other. We conclude by showing how our empirical analysis addresses some    long-standing 
9 
10 conceptual ambiguities in the idea and practice of public   participation. 
11 
12 
13 
14 Methods and Data 
15 
16 
17 Our primary units of comparison are the national health care systems of countries, which 
18 include Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, England, Germany, New Zealand, South Africa, 
19 
20 South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the USA. The USA is a special case,   however. 
21 
22 Although the various institutions of medical care finance (the Veterans Administration, 
23 Medicare, Medicaid and the private insurers) make decisions on priorities, there is no one 
24 
25 national body that evaluates interventions for their value.  However,    there are two distinct 
26 
27 bodies, the work of which is related to priority setting. One is the Institute for Clinical and 
28 Economic Review (ICER), an independent non-profit body that conducts health technology 
29 
30 assessment.   The other is the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute  (PCORI), 
31 
32 mandated by Congress to gather research to improve the quality of evidence on the clinical 
33 effectiveness of health care interventions. These two bodies are included, alongside the 
34 
35 country cases, in our  analysis. 
36 
37 Data on the cases comes from reports presented by country experts at the workshop held in 
38 
39 the Brocher Foundation in November 2015 (Littlejohns, Kieslich and Weale, 2016).   Slides   in 
40 
41 PDF form giving details of those reports are available at: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/socialvalues. 
42 These country reports have been supplemented by information derived from secondary 
43 
44 literature and data sources cited in relation to Table   1. 
45 
46 Although the sample of countries omits some potentially important cases, with    no country 
47 
48 from the former Soviet bloc or Arab world included, it does represent a wide range in terms 
49 of geography as well as social and political structure. The countries have not been selected 
51 because they show evidence of public participation initiatives.  That is to say, they have    not 
52 
53 been selected on the variable of interest (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 139-49; Landman, 
54 2000: 44-5). Looking simply at systems chosen for positive public participation risks 
56 observation bias and false inference, particularly in respect of the effects of participation.     As 
57 
58 Berry, Portney and Thomson    (1993: 73-81) showed when looking at measures to increase 
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1 
2 
3 public participation in US cities, seemingly positive results disappeared when compared to    a 
4 
5 control sample in which there were no such measures. More generally, surveys of 
6 participation initiatives are largely restricted to well-established democracies (Conklin et al., 
7 
8 2005 and Mitton et al., 2009), which are likely to have their own distinctive    dynamics and 
9 
10 patterns of participation and political mobilization. By including countries outside the group 
11 of well-established democracies, we avoid these sources of potential observation bias. 
12 
13 
14 A similar bias in many studies is towards participation that is initiated by administrative 
15 actors, either as part of their mandate or as an attempt to reach out to new forms of public 
16 
17 engagement.  The effect is to neglect the importance of non-invited forms of    participation, 
18 
19 forms that may be as important, if not more important, than invited forms (compare Stewart, 
20 2016: 14). By making the unit of selection the country case, we open our analysis out to the 
21 
22 contestatory forms of  participation. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 Country Contexts 
28 
29 The twelve countries include a range of political experience, and exemplify the three waves 
30 of democracy (Huntington, 1996). Following the Polity IV data-set we can classify them as 
32 follows (see: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).  Four  (Australia, England, 
33 
34 New Zealand and the USA) are Anglophone first-wave democracies, which achieved 
35 substantial mass enfranchisement by the first part of the twentieth century, building on the 
37 beginnings of democratization from the early part of the nineteenth centuries.   Of   course, 
38 
39 even in these cases, major developments were needed for the    country fully to meet conditions 
40 
41 of democracy, for example in the southern states of the USA before the 1965 Voting Rights 
42 Act. Alongside these four first-wave democracies, there are three second-wave democracies 
43 
44 (Colombia, Germany and Sri Lanka) each with a history of continuous democracy, to varying 
45 
46 degrees, from the middle of the twentieth century to the present. Although Sri Lanka had 
47 universal franchise since the 1930s, it counts as second wave since until 1948 it was a UK 
48 
49 colony.  In the case of both Colombia and Sri Lanka their history of    democracy is also 
50 
51 marked by extensive civil violence. There are three third-wave democracies (Brazil, South 
52 Korea and South Africa) and two countries without an extended history of democracy, 
53 
54 including Thailand, in which there have been significant periods of military rule, and    China, 
55 
56 which is a one-party system. 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 These differences in democratic experience do not correlate in any simple way with    the 
4 
5 institutionalization of universal health care. Germany was the first country in the world to 
6 institutionalize a form of collectivized provision for health care in 1883 in the Wilhelmine 
7 
8 Empire under Bismarck. Sri Lanka    had tax-funded universal health care in the 1930s while it 
9 
10 was still a British colony. The South Korean health insurance scheme was first introduced in 
11 1977 when the country was under military rule and achieved universal health care in 1988 
12 
13 under the last president from a military background. By contrast,    the USA did not achieve 
14 
15 anything like universal health care until the 2010 Affordable Care Act. These complex 
16 patterns suggest important issues in the dynamics of political legitimacy. One obvious 
17 
18 hypothesis is that sometimes authoritarian systems seek to enhance a potentially    vulnerable 
19 
20 legitimacy through social reforms, including the extension of health care provision. 
21 Conversely, democratic systems, in which there is the freedom of groups and interests to 
22 
23 mobilize may create the conditions in which health care reform can be blocked by    political 
24 
25 mobilization, of which the    USA is the most obvious example (Marmor and Oberlander, 2011). 
26 
27 The familiar distinction between Bismarck and Beveridge    systems of health care financing is 
28 
29 increasingly coming under strain, in part from the influx of tax support in social insurance 
30 systems and in part from moves to provider competition in social insurance markets under the 
31 
32 influence of ideas from new public management (Greer, Wismar and Figueras, 2016,    7-8; 
33 
34 Okma and de Roo, 2009). Nonetheless, in terms of governance, the relative autonomy of 
35 social insurance funds is still a relevant distinguishing institutional characteristic in 
36 
37 classifying countries according to their predominant mode of financing in securing    universal 
38 
39 health care. Three of our twelve countries have collective provision that is based on social 
40 insurance systems (Colombia, Germany and South Korea). All the other systems, with the 
41 
42 exception of the USA, use revenue derived from taxation as the predominant    instrument to 
43 
44 extend coverage to the majority of those unable to pay for private insurance. The USA stands 
45 out as a highly pluralistic system, with private and occupational coverage, Medicare, 
46 
47 Medicaid, the Veterans’ Administration and, since the 2010 Affordable Care Act,    mandated 
48 
49 private insurance. Private insurance plays a significant role in all the countries, although to 
50 varying degrees. In some countries, for example South Korea, there is some public regulation 
51 
52 of private insurance cover. 
53 
54 Eight of our twelve countries have formal institutions conducting HTA that have at    least 
55 
56 some part in priority setting, including the country with the oldest of such institutions,    namely 
57 
58 the Pharmaceutical Benefits Assessment Committee (PBAC) in Australia.   China and   Sri 
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1 
2 
3 Lanka do not, and neither does South Africa although    there are efforts underway to create one. 
4 
5 Again, the USA is a special case. Formally, it does not have an HTA agency. However, 
6 PCORI conducts research on patient-oriented care and an independent body, ICER, 
7 
8 undertakes work on cost-effectiveness. Nevertheless, the absence of a collectivized system    of 
9 
10 health service financing and payment means that there is no national agency equivalent to 
11 that found in other countries. Key elements of health care financing and the presence or 
12 
13 otherwise of a HTA agency are summarized for these countries in Table 1, together    with 
14 
15 information on forms of public  participation. 
16 
17 [Table 1 about here.] 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 Opportunity Structures 
23 
24 Political opportunity structures are important in relation to the political involvement    and 
25 
26 mobilization of citizens on matters of public policy. The concept helps highlight the extent to 
27 which institutional structures are open or closed to public participation. For example, some 
29 administrative and constitutional processes permit a right of opposition at the    agenda-setting 
30 
31 or formation stage of policy, whereas in other political systems opposition is channelled into 
32 the implementation stage of policy. If we are interested in understanding the forms and 
34 effectiveness of public participation, it is always a pertinent question to ask where   public 
35 
36 movements may realistically seek to make their influence   felt. 
37 
38 A number of countries in our sample include provision for the representation of patients,    the 
39 
40 public or consumers in the governance of health care, either as part of an HTA process or as 
41 part of the resource allocation process more generally. (For the sake of brevity we shall speak 
43 of ‘public’ representation in the bulk of the paper, returning at the end to the conceptual 
44 
45 complexities implicit in the notion.) In terms of governance, Brazil and Colombia provide 
46 for public representatives on decision-making bodies at various levels of government, Brazil 
48 within the different levels of its federal system (federal, state and local) and Colombia    in its 
49 
50 decentralized system. In Brazil, public representatives on the Health Councils, which make 
51 decisions on resource allocation and service provision, are thought of as citizen 
53 representatives, sitting alongside representatives of the government, providers and    health 
54 
55 professionals to formulate policy. In England there is a place reserved for lay representatives 
56 in the Clinical Commissioning Groups who have responsibility for commissioning according 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 to    population needs and are responsible for the finance of much of the care that is provided, 
4 
5 as well as NHS England at various locations in the decision-making structures. In South 
6 Africa, the Community Health Committees are supposed to provide a public voice in relation 
7 
8 to the work of the tier of local government (metropolitan, district or local) that has   the 
9 
10 responsibility for providing health services in a locality. By contrast two of the sample, 
11 China and Sri Lanka, have systems of general decision-making that are professionally 
12 
13 dominated, with little or no effective role for organized groups to contribute    to governance. 
14 
15 Although priority setting is implicit in any governance process, HTA agencies occupy   a 
16 
17 special place in relation to public involvement and participation.   They provide a   particular 
18 
19 set of opportunity structures by reference to which participation can take place, both as focal 
20 points and as stimuli. They are focal points because their processes are a tangible point at 
21 
22 which otherwise diffuse forms of resource allocation take place.    They are stimuli, because the 
23 
24 decisions that they make, in particular decisions to deny or delist treatments, provide the 
25 impetus for public engagement on the part of patient groups, industry and others. Moreover, 
26 
27 independent or quasi-independent public agencies often have a sense that they are subject to a 
28 
29 legitimacy deficit that can only be remedied through some form of patient or public 
30 involvement. HTA agencies may sometimes be established in the hope that, in rendering 
31 
32 decisions on priorities through methods of technical assessment, they can thereby   de- 
33 
34 politicise priority-setting, as in the example of NICE (Klein, 2013: 199-204). Ironically, 
35 however, such bodies often feel the need to secure public involvement in order to render their 
36 
37 decision-making legitimate. For this reason, it is not simply a question of the supply   of 
38 
39 political participation from the side of the public; it is also a question of the demand for 
40 political participation on the part of administrative agencies. 
41 
42 
43 It is well known that the ‘public’ is defined in different ways both by analysts and by 
44 administrators and policy makers (Conklin et al., 2015: 154; Mitton et al., 2009: 223). It is 
45 
46 no surprise, therefore, to see that different HTA agencies use different principles for    public 
47 
48 representation in their processes of decision-making. For example, in Australia the public 
49 representative on PBAC and the Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC) are thought 
50 
51 of as consumer representatives.   In New Zealand PHARMAC has a consumer advisory   panel. 
52 
53 In South Korea, in relation to the HTA agencies, the representatives are drawn from distinct 
54 social groups, including labour and consumer organizations. In Germany the representatives 
55 
56 on the Federal Joint Committee, which receive information from the    HTA body IQWiG, are 
57 
58 patient representatives. In the USA PCORI has a governing board that aims to   be 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 representative of the community at large, and stakeholders propose topics for    investigation. 
4 
5 In Colombia, IETS uses open online consultations to reach out to the different stakeholders, 
6 patient organizations and the general public. In Brazil, Conitec provides different 
7 
8 questionnaires for both the general public and health professionals through its official    website 
9 
10 in order to promote public  consultation. 
11 
12 Participation can occur at various stages of the decision process for HTA agencies.    For 
13 
14 example, in Korea the National Evidence-based Healthcare Collaborating Agency has a topic 
15 solicitation process by which suggestions for research can be submitted by members of the 
16 
17 public, as well as academia and policy makers.   In Thailand, patient groups, lay people   and 
18 
19 civil society organizations play an important role in making suggestions to the National 
20 Health Security Office, the Universal Coverage Scheme managing authority, as to which 
21 
22 technologies should be evaluated (Mohara et al., 2012).  The public can also be    involved 
23 
24 through representation on various bodies in HTA agencies, or through participation in 
25 advisory panels. By contrast, public participation in a body like NICE does not have an 
26 
27 agenda-setting role in determining the interventions to be appraised.   Those topics  are 
28 
29 initially determined by the government through the Department of   Health. 
30 
31 Although a great deal of theoretical and research interest has been shown in minipublics,    they 
32 
33 do not feature prominently in the forms of public participation in most countries, either in 
34 relation to general governance or in relation to priority setting (Whitty, 2013). In terms of 
35 
36 their role in the formal policy process, England stands out in its use of   minipublics, in 
37 
38 particular the NICE Citizens Council, which comprises thirty members of the public selected 
39 to be broadly representative in demographic terms (Davies, Wetherell and Barnett, 2006; 
40 
41 Littlejohns and Rawlins, 2009), and the NHS England Citizen Assembly.   ICER and   PCORI 
42 
43 in the USA also use minipublic processes. For example, ICER has used public deliberation 
44 and voting to help determine value in relation to medicines, breaking up the country into a 
45 
46 group for New England, one for the Mid-West and one for California.     On these panels, two- 
47 
48 thirds of the participants are physicians and the remainder are patient groups or public 
49 members. The South Korean health insurance agency has responded to the experimental use 
50 
51 of a minipublic on the willingness to pay to expand the drug formulary and set up    such a 
52 
53 panel on a more permanent basis. By contrast, in most of our sample minipublics have been 
54 the preserve of researchers, interested in eliciting public preferences for example, or have 
55 
56 been used relatively little, including in quite highly developed systems like Germany.     One 
57 
58 hypothesis is that these patterns reflect the balance between professional influence and power 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 in a health care system (strong in Sri Lanka, China and Germany), as distinct from    other 
4 
5 groups, particularly politicians or managers, in other systems. However, this hypothesis 
6 would require more evidence fully to test its plausibility. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 From Opportunities  to Mobilization 
12 
13 There is one particular reason why HTA agencies are likely to be a focal point   of 
14 
15 participation, namely their role in denying or limiting access to interventions that    may be 
16 
17 widely or intensely demanded by the public, particularly when those interventions are 
18 pharmaceutical products with strong industry backing. Considerations of cost-effectiveness, 
19 
20 alongside other criteria, act as a hurdle to access and sometimes lead to a    decision not to 
21 
22 cover or include in the drug formulary medicines for which there is evidence for clinical 
23 effectiveness but not cost-effectiveness. These decisions therefore affect the extent to which 
24 
25 the medical care provided by a system is comprehensive as well as equitable,    presenting no 
26 
27 financial barriers to access. Low cost access to an inadequate range of therapies will seem to 
28 the public to be a breach of the principle of universal health care. Moreover, the processes 
29 
30 and chains of reasoning that HTA agencies use to assess cost-effectiveness are    typically 
31 
32 esoteric, drawing upon economic and statistical modelling, sampling assumptions and 
33 measures of outcome that only make sense within a particular policy paradigm. Members of 
34 
35 the public, particularly patient groups, may also be sceptical of the feasibility constraints that 
36 
37 cost-effectiveness analysis involves, holding in particular that costs are not a natural given 
38 but something that may be affected by policy decisions as well as accounting conventions. It 
39 
40 is not, therefore, surprising that, in different countries, much participatory activity takes    place 
41 
42 around questions about access to pharmaceuticals, perhaps also symbolizing a broader range 
43 of concerns about access to care. 
44 
45 
46 In England patient groups have mobilized around access to pharmaceuticals that NICE has 
47 judged cost ineffective, including Abiraterone and Herceptin. Herceptin has also been an 
48 
49 issue in New Zealand and Australia.   In South Korea, mobilization has occurred   around 
50 
51 several new drugs that were not being covered in the national formulary, as well as coverage 
52 in the regulated private insurance system used to cover out-of-pocket expenses, in particular 
53 
54 for Xalkori for lung cancer in 2015, where eventually the mobilized groups    pushed the 
55 
56 financial authority to rule in their favor. In Brazil mobilization has taken place over 
57 Fingolimod, following the precedent of mobilization in 1996, which led to free combination 
58 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 antiretroviral therapy being offered to all citizens with AIDS. However, although an    HTA 
4 
5 agency provides a focal point for mobilization, it is certainly not a necessary condition. In 
6 South Africa, without an HTA agency, patient groups, following the campaigns around AIDS 
7 
8 medicines, have mobilized in the Treatment Action Campaign on such matters as    reduction in 
9 
10 drug pricing and the development of needs-based budgeting. Even in the silent system of Sri 
11 Lanka, there has been a move to supply HPV vaccine, though this was professionally led. 
12 
13 
14 In any system it is always possible that there will be contestatory participation taking the 
15 form of protests and campaigns against administrative decision-making. However, we can 
16 
17 distinguish cases where such participation is occasional and supplementary to   more 
18 
19 routinized forms of participation from cases where contestatory participation is a major 
20 characteristic of the policy making process. How is the extent and seriousness of 
21 
22 institutionalized participation related to the character of the public participation?    Answering 
23 
24 this question depends on making a distinction between public participation in formal 
25 decision-making that is consequential from participation where it is not. 
26 
27 
28 There is no one test that can simply be applied to determine whether a system treats formal 
29 public participation seriously and one where it does not. However, as a first cut, one test is to 
30 
31 distinguish those cases of public participation in which public representatives can    influence 
32 
33 policy agendas, as distinct from those cases where they cannot. Sometimes this can mean 
34 having formal or quasi-formal agenda-setting responsibilities; sometimes it is a matter of 
35 
36 sitting as a full member on a decision-making body.     For example, with the HITAP process in 
37 
38 Thailand, the public representatives have a role in proposing or prioritizing topics for analysis. 
39 In Germany patient representatives sit on the high level body that makes a decision on the 
40 
41 added benefit of pharmaceuticals that have been evaluated by IQWiG. In England,   the 
42 
43 emergent NHS Citizen invites and facilitates broad, deliberative input to board priorities via 
44 online and physical forums which are, in turn, mediated by a Citizens’ Jury. By contrast, in 
45 
46 other countries, participation appears to be token.  The members of the Community    Health 
47 
48 Councils in South Africa generally fall into this category as do the patient representatives in 
49 South Korea. In South Africa, community participation is entrenched in various policy 
50 
51 documents and formalised in the National Health Act which makes provision for   the 
52 
53 establishment of community health committees, hospital boards and local health councils. 
54 The members of these committees are supposed to ensure community participation in the 
55 
56 governance of local clinics.  While the political climate is in theory supportive of    community 
57 
58 participation, and while there are some Community Health Committees in existence    with 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 public representation, the role of these bodies is poorly defined, ultimately not    functioning 
4 
5 optimally with members having little input in decision making but rather playing the role of 
6 pseudo community health workers. Similarly, in Brazil and Colombia lay representation on 
7 
8 Health Councils takes place at the different levels of political organization, but members    are 
9 
10 sometimes nominated rather than being independently   selected. 
11 
12 In our sample, there are four countries where contestatory participation is routine:    Brazil, 
13 
14 Colombia, South Africa and South Korea. For example, in Colombia and Brazil, there is 
15 extensive use of the courts to challenge the denial of access as a violation of their right to 
16 
17 health. In    some cases, patients seek access to medicines to which they would be entitled to by 
18 
19 policy, but that are denied them through failures of implementation. In other cases, patients 
20 seek access to medicines that have not been included or have been explicitly deemed 
21 
22 ineligible for coverage as a result of priority setting (Dittrich et al., 2016).  Every   year 
23 
24 thousands of patients use this contestatory participation path to highlight failures in the 
25 provision of services or to overturn results of HTA and benefit basket design. Judges usually 
26 
27 rule in favor of the plaintiffs. This phenomenon has escalated to the higher courts that have, 
28 
29 in some cases, mandated reforms be made in order to address the underlying roots of this 
30 avalanche of litigation. 
31 
32 
33 The constitutional right to health has also been a focal point for mobilization by many 
34 advocacy groups in South Africa. Some have used litigation to empower a social movement, 
35 
36 like in the case of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and Section 27. The former is a 
37 
38 HIV/AIDS civil society organisation and the latter a public interest law centre that uses 
39 research, advocacy and litigation to ensure among others, access to health care. TAC has 
40 
41 campaigned and litigated since 1998 for access to AIDS treatment. Their most    significant 
42 
43 success was the 2002 Constitutional Court ruling which held that government must provide 
44 treatment to combat mother to child transmission of HIV. This case enshrined South Africans’ 
45 
46 right to access to treatment proven to be     a core treatment and medically necessary but noted 
47 
48 that this access may not be available immediately and that the State ought to provide it as 
49 soon as reasonably possible. The TAC has used this same approach of advocacy alongside 
50 
51 litigation to achieve several other outcomes, one of    which was reduction in drug pricing. 
52 
53 More recently, a collaborative project, known as Stop Stock Outs, between the TAC, Section 
54 27 and others has focused on using protest, advocacy and litigation to address the issue of 
55 
56 drug stock outs in the country and to force policy makers to prioritize better.   Another 
57 
58 organization known as the Rural Health Advocacy project focuses specifically on    improved 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 access to quality health care services for people living in rural South Africa. This group uses 
4 
5 evidence and advocacy in its aim to influence decision-making in line with rural realities. 
6 These three examples of advocacy organisations have been established independently of the 
7 
8 state and have forced their way into the priority setting process, albeit with varying levels    of 
9 
10 success. 
11 
12 South Africa’s broader political context committed to democratic principles provides on    the 
13 
14 one hand an enabling environment for public participation, but on the other, protects the state 
15 in its role as the decision-making authority. This context, alongside a legacy of community 
16 
17 mobilization and protest has resulted in citizens increasingly articulating their   concerns 
18 
19 outside of government provided channels where their voice is louder. Similarly, in Korea, 
20 resort to street protest is routine since it was the means originally to convert the military 
21 
22 regime to democracy. In 2008, the candlelight    protest gathered 50,000 people worrying about 
23 
24 mad cow disease from US beef imports on the street with candles. It symbolized the Koreans’ 
25 changing interest in relation to health related issues. In 2010, a group of left-wing activists 
26 
27 including the hospital chapter of one nationwide labor    union formed a coalition for free 
28 
29 health. This group is asking for increasing coverage of the National Health Insurance by 
30 allocating more government budget to the health sector. This coalition is still active and 
31 
32 posted “vote against” list of candidates for the general election in 2016 in its   website 
33 
34 (http://medical.jinbo.net/xe/). 
35 
36 In some countries, then, contestatory participation is so extensive as almost to be    a routine 
37 
38 element of the policy making process. This in turn suggests that we can divide our sample 
39 into two categories in two different dimensions. We can classify public representation by the 
40 
41 extent to which it is either token or has some agenda shaping influence on the one hand, and 
42 
43 we can classify systems by the extent to which constestatory participation is either routine or 
44 not on the other. With two categories in two dimensions we have the four possibilities 
45 
46 illustrated in Table 2. 
47 
48 [Table 2 about here.] 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Table 2 shows a broadly inverse relationship between representatives having   some 
54 
55 meaningful power within the system of resource allocation and an absence of    contestatory 
56 
57 participation.   Although Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Thailand and England have   never 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 been entirely free of contestation, it is not the routine feature of health policy making that it is 
4 
5 in Brazil, Colombia, South Africa and South Korea. The fact that cell A is empty is 
6 confirmation of some inverse association between significant representation and contestatory 
7 
8 participation.  There is no country that gives public representatives a serious role    in priority 
9 
10 settings decisions and that is also pervaded by the contests that are seen in the countries in 
11 cell B. 
12 
13 
14 Three of the four countries in which contestatory participation is a routine part of the policy 
15 making process (cell B) are third-wave democracies, and Colombia has been a second-wave 
16 
17 democracy under strain over decades.   The process of democratization in these   countries 
18 
19 involved political mobilization on a large scale over a number of years. One important case 
20 in this context is Brazil, where mobilization over health issues was a central part of the more 
21 
22 general community-based democratic movement. However, when the 1990   law 
23 
24 institutionalizing public participation in the Health Councils was being debated, there was a 
25 division of views in the health movement, with significant elements claiming that it was 
26 
27 impossible to be an opponent of the    state whilst interacting with it through formalized means 
28 
29 (Dall’Agno Modesta et al. 2007: 16). Where oppositional mobilization is a central element in 
30 political contestation, it may be hard to move towards effective forms of more 
31 
32 institutionalized  participation. 
33 
34 However, such an analysis cannot be over-generalized.  Thailand lacks a history   of 
35 
36 continuous democracy.  However, it does have a politics of mass mobilization.   In   priority 
37 
38 setting, however, it lacks the contestatory style of Brazil, South Africa and South Korea. One 
39 possible explanation is that, following from its experience of dealing with AIDS in the 1980s 
40 
41 when it engaged intensely with patient groups and representatives, Thailand    institutionalized 
42 
43 patient involvement in policy making in more than a token way (Rasanathan et al. 2012; 
44 Tantivess and Walt, 2008). The case would suggest that it is not the general experience of 
45 
46 democratic politics or mass mobilization for democracy that is important, but   the 
47 
48 institutionally specific ways in which public participation is facilitated or inhibited together 
49 with the larger confounding variables of political structure. 
50 
51 
52 The three interesting off-diagonal cases are in cell D. These exhibit different routes to the 
53 same outcome: public participation with low significance for priority setting but the absence 
54 
55 of contestatory participation.  In the case of China    the outcome is to be explained by the 
56 
57 general restrictions on freedom of association and political protest.   Sri Lanka stands out as   a 
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1 
2 
3 particularly interesting null case.   The early establishment of universal health coverage in   the 
4 
5 1930s together with the inherited system of professional domination seems to have left a 
6 legacy in which a traditional medical domination is still to be found. Finally, in the USA the 
7 
8 absence of a single national priority setting agency means that there is nothing for    political 
9 
10 protest to mobilise around. Individual law suits may be common, and they may have class 
11 action effects, but the institutional dynamic is different from one in which a central decision 
12 
13 provides a focal point of protest.     None of these three off-diagonal countries has an HTA 
14 
15 agency with the scope and significance of those found in other countries, and none are likely 
16 to have one in the near future. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 Conclusion 
22 
23 Our comparative review has highlighted some basic issues of theory and    organization that 
24 
25 have been identified for some time (Marmor and Klein,    2012, chapter 10), involving the 
26 
27 character of public participation, the accountability of public representatives to the public 
28 they are supposed to represent, the effectiveness of those representatives and the place of 
29 
30 state structures and capacities when considering the role of the public    in priority setting. 
31 
32 Although public participation is often advocated and promoted by activists and policy makers, 
33 
34 there remain conceptual ambiguities as to its character that are seldom, if ever, resolved in the 
35 policy process. Whether we are talking about the public in the formal decision-making 
37 process or a selected sample of citizens in a minipublic, we are always referring   to 
38 
39 representatives of the public when we are thinking of public participation.  Conditions    of 
40 
41 assembly government, in which all citizens come together to determine the conditions of their 
42 common life, do not exist in the modern world outside particular places like some communes 
43 
44 in Switzerland.     Moreover, there is often an ambiguity as to what portion of the public public 
45 
46 representatives are supposed to represent and the extent to which they are consulted or 
47 become more actively involved or engaged, so that they become partners in the process. 
48 
49 Sometimes they are characterized as consumers, sometimes as patients and sometimes    as 
50 
51 citizens. These distinctions matter in priority setting. If public representatives have a role in 
52 commenting on how health services are delivered, then there is unlikely to be a serious 
53 
54 discrepancy between the roles of patient, consumer and citizen.  It is reasonable for    citizens 
55 
56 to want consumers of health services to be satisfied with their care, and one of the best ways 
57 of knowing whether they will be satisfied or not is to obtain the views of those patients who 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 have had experience of care.  By contrast, with resource allocation,    there are many built-in 
4 
5 conflicts of interest: among different patient groups, as well as between citizens as consumers 
6 and citizens as tax-payers. If public participation is to be more than a slogan in relation to 
7 
8 priority setting, then those responsible for the design of institutions and practices need to 
9 
10 address the differences in the roles and responsibilities that different forms of public 
11 representation involves. 
12 
13 
14 Secondly, the use of minipublics prompts a number of questions. The concept of 
15 representation in minipublics is normally a descriptive one. Members of a minipublic are 
16 
17 supposed to be a microcosm of society, partly with the aim of rectifying the imbalance   of 
18 
19 voice among different social groups in the broader political and policy making process. The 
20 basis of this descriptive representation is normally demographic. However, it can be argued 
21 
22 that this is only one possible basis of selection, and    that equal, if not more, attention should 
23 
24 be given to religious, cultural or social attitudes. After all, in relation to the priority to be 
25 given to IVF or the extent to which personal responsibility should be taken into account, 
26 
27 conviction is likely to be more important than membership of a particular social group.     The 
28 
29 issue is partly a practical matter for health service management, but it is also one that carries 
30 wider implications, since it highlights the extent to which administratively sponsored 
31 
32 participation reflects some of the problems of ‘engineering democracy’ (Blaug, 2002).     It 
33 
34 would go too far to say that sponsored or engineered democracy is problematic in and of 
35 itself; public organizations have good reasons for wishing to enhance their engagement with 
36 
37 the public.     However, it would also be misleading to say that minipublics can be a substitute 
38 
39 for a vibrant civil society. 
40 
41 Thirdly, there is a case to be made for saying that presence matters (Phillips, 1995).     It is hard 
42 
43 to find evidence that the public’s representatives are enormously influential in policy making. 
44 Nonetheless, this is not to say that their presence in decision-making is unimportant, rather 
45 
46 that expectations of their feasible role need to be more finely calibrated. As    our case studies 
47 
48 have shown, there are instances where formal representatives do seem to exercise some 
49 agenda-setting power in relation to specific issues, inducing policies that would not otherwise 
50 
51 have occurred, or they have some influence on the way in which issues are constructed and 
52 
53 determined. More generally, it is an open question as to the extent to which their presence in 
54 the decision-making system reconciles the public at large to the decisions that have been 
55 
56 made. 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 Fourthly, the cases of contestatory participation highlight    the importance of state structures 
4 
5 and administrative capacity in the policy making process. Contestatory participation is 
6 typically prompted by failures of implementation, problems of corruption or a lack of state 
7 
8 capacity to create the conditions of citizenship for all, an issue    that is particularly important 
9 
10 when priority setting involves fundamental interests. It grows out of a contrast between 
11 ambitious constitutional promises and poor system performance. Large macro variables like 
12 
13 state structure and capacity ought to influence how policy makers think about how    public 
14 
15 participation is best fostered and responded to in the context of an understanding about what 
16 state structures facilitate or inhibit. State structures evolve and are changed over time, but just 
17 
18 as it is easier to create the formal rules of democracy than its effective practice, so it is easy to 
19 
20 borrow forms of public participation without that participation articulating legitimate    interests. 
21 
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8 Financing, HTA and Forms of Public Participation: Key Data 
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Country Predominant Basis 
of Universal 
Coverage 
National HTA 
Agency with a Key 
National Priority- 
Setting Function 
Forms of Public Representation 
Australia Medicare scheme 
funded predominantly 
from taxation. 
Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Advisory 
Committee (PBAC) 
for pharmaceuticals. 
Medical Services 
Advisory Committee 
(MSAC) for medical 
devices and. 
Consumer representative member on Committee. 
Stakeholder input (including patient and public engagement) invited for individual 
technology assessments. 
Brazil National Health 
System predominantly 
funded from taxation. 
National Committee 
for Technology 
Incorporation 
(CONITEC). 
Participatory Health Councils at local, federal and state level with a mandate for 
equitable access to healthcare, social participation and social mobilisation. 
China Basic social medical 
insurance for 
employees. 
Rural cooperative 
None. 
There are some 
academic HTA 
groups/institutions 
Expert panels are formed to participate in the process to determine drug 
reimbursement list. 
There is process by which the drug reimbursement list open to consultation, 
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28 
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18 
27 
 medical insurance for 
rural residents. 
Basic social medical 
insurance for urban 
residents. 
across China. although it is mainly professionally dominated. 
Colombia Universal Social 
Health Insurance 
funded through 
payroll taxes and 
general taxation. All 
citizens have access to 
the same basket of 
services. 
The Institute for 
Health Technology 
Assessment (IETS). 
User Associations to monitor health service quality and mediate between 
insurers/providers/service  users. 
Customer Service Offices to protect and promote quality improvements. 
England National Health 
Service predominantly 
funded through 
general taxation. 
National Institute for 
Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE). 
Patient representatives on appraisal and guidance committees. 
Citizens Council minipublic, selected on a purposive basis, to advise on general 
issues. 
Germany Social insurance. Institute for Quality 
and Efficiency in 
Health Care (IQWiG) 
and the Federal Joint 
Committee (FJC). 
IQWiG working groups allow patient groups to address items on the agenda. 
Patient representatives on the FJC but without voting rights. 
South 
Korea 
Social insurance. National Evidence- 
based Healthcare 
In the process of setting up a Citizen Committee for Participation to incorporate 
social value judgements in priority setting is in discussion 
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24 
  Collaborating Agency 
(NECA). 
Health Insurance 
Review and 
Assessment Service 
(HIRA). 
 
New 
Zealand 
General taxation. Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency 
(PHARMAC). 
Consumer Advisory Committee advises on policies, optimal medicine use and 
funding issues. 
South General taxation for a None, but attempts to Supported and specified in official policy 
Africa government provided 
service used by 68% 
of the population. 
create one 
Some formal structures in place but limited role in decision making advocacy. 
Litigation and protest more of an impact on priority setting. 
 16% of the population   
 use private insurance.   
 16% of expenditure   
 from out-of-pocket.   
 Moving towards a   
 National Health   
 Insurance (White   
 Paper on NHI released   
 in 2016).   
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19 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
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31 
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38 
39 
Sri Lanka General taxation. None, but has a rapid 
assessment technique 
for health care service 
evaluations. 
None. 
Thailand Three tax-based 
schemes: the Civil 
Servant Medical 
Benefit Scheme 
(CSMBS), Social 
Security Scheme 
(SSS) and Universal 
Coverage Scheme 
(UCS). The last 
covers essential care 
for 75% of the 
population. 
Health Intervention 
and Technology 
Assessment 
Programme (HITAP). 
Representatives of patients associations, people networks and civil society 
organizations alongside academics, health professionals, MOH departments and 
health product industries are involved in different stages of benefit package 
development including HTA. 
USA Highly pluralistic, 
including Medicare , 
Medicaid , Veterans’ 
Administration and 
mandated private 
insurance. 
None. Patient- 
Centered Outcome 
Research Institute 
(PCORI) and Institute 
for Clinical and 
Economic Review 
(ICER) conduct 
relevant research. 
PCORI have public comment periods/ an Engagement Plan to shape the nature of 
research. 
ICER has 3 Advisory Boards, one for each of its public deliberation programs: 
New England Comparative Effectiveness Public Advisory Council (CEPAC); 
Midwest CEPAC; and the California Technology Assessment Forum (CTAF). 
Advisory Boards guide topic selection and provide advice on methods to enhance 
uptake and application of evidence reports to clinical practice and insurance 
coverage. 
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